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The West German Model of Codetermination
Under Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA
Industries in the United States have been experimenting with in-
novative forms of labor relations in an effort to enhance peaceful in-
dustrial relations. Models have been designed to increase employee
input into the decisionmaking process and to create more challenging
and interesting jobs for workers.' Due to the apparent success of West
Germany's Mitbestimmung, or codetermination, such a system may be-
come attractive to business enterprises in the United States.
Codetermination is a type of corporate structure in which those
who provide their services to the corporate entity determine and execute
corporate policies equally with those who represent the financial re-
sources.2  Under this model, parity in the decisionmaking process is
sought at the level of the board of directors. This note will discuss
the West German model of codetermination, and suggest that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 would not pose an inpediment
to the implementation of a codetermination model by an employer in
a non-unionized, American business enterprise.
1 See, e.g., Whyte, Organizations for the Future, in TMa NEXT TwENTY-n YEARs
or INDusTRiAI RELAnoNs, 129 (G. Somers ed. 1973); Note, Does Employer Implementa-
tion of Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tLions Act?, 49 IND. LJ. 516 (1974).
2 The theoretical foundation of codetermination evolved in the post World War I era,
and constitutes a reconciliation between Marxian socialism and capitalism in which
equality between owners and workers in controlling the economic system was sought.
Beal, Origins of Codetermination, 8 IND. & LAB. Ran. REV. 483, 486-92 (1955); Hartman,
Codetermination in West Germany, 9 IND. REL. 137, 140 (1970); Vagts, Reforming the
"Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARv. L. Pav. 23, 30 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vagts]. When codetermination was implemented in the early 1950's
an additional rationale for its adoption was that it would guard against the resurgence of
Nazism. D. JENKIns, INDUSTRALL DEmocRAcy rN ExmorE: TaE CMIrxENoa AND MAN-
AGEEN RESPONSES 31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JEaNaIsi; McPherson, Codetermina-
tion: Germany's Move Toward a New Economy, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 20, 22 (1952).
However, this argument has waned and it is no longer viewed as an objective of code-
termination. JENxiNs at 31; Hartman, supra, at 140. Current literautre emphasizes the
attainment of industrial democracy and corporate social responsibility as the goals of
codetermination. See, JENKINs at 10; Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate
Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest"
or "Publid" Directors, 53 BosToN U.L. REv. 547 (1973); Hartman, suPra at 140-42; Simitis,
Workers' Participation in the Enterprise-Transcending Company Law?, 38 MODERN L.
REv. 1 (1975); Comment, Codetermination in West Germany, 51 ORE. L. Rav. 214, 215, 221
(1971).
3 The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1970).
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THE WEST GERMAN MODEL OF CODETERMINATION
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
As opposed to the American corporation with its single board of
directors, German corporations have two boards: the supervisory board,
Aufsichtrat, and the managing board, Vorstand. At the top of the
corporate hierarchy is the supervisory board which is designed to be an
intermediary between management and stockholders.4 It does not con-
duct the business of the corporation, but has the limited functions of
appointing and overseeing the managing board. The actual determina-
tion and execution of corporate policy is left to the managing board5
which consists of three directors, a sales director, a production director,
and a labor director,' who operate independently in their areas of
specialty, and collectively on matters of overall policy.'
Codetermination
The key to the German model of full codetermination is its pro-
vision for equal representation of stockholders and employees on the
supervisory board.8 Thus, of a normal supervisory board of 11 di-
rectors, five would be labor representatives.' The German Trade Union
Federation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB) selects one di-
rector, and the industry DGB-affiliated union selects another. Another
two directors are selected by the Works Council, which itself is directly
4 Vagts at 50.
1 Id. at 51. However, same major decisions must be approved by the supervisory
board. JENxiNs at 32.6 Beal, supra note 2, at 486; McPherson, supra note 2, at 22.
7 Beal, supra note 2, at 486. See Vagts at 50. The supervisory board may decide to
have more than three managing directors. See McPherson, Codetermination in Practice, 8
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 499, 505 (1955).
8 Full codetermination was enacted in 1951 as a supplement to collective bargaining
for firms with more than 1,000 employees in the iron, steel, and coal industries.
The framework of labor relations in West Germany is still based on collective bar-
gaining through unions. This is not necessarily in conflict with codetermination because
collective bargaining is at a different level. There is single national union, the German
Trade Union Federation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or DGB). Each industry has its
own DGB-affiliated union, and collective bargaining is on an industry-wide basis. Mc-
Pherson, supra note 2, at 23; Vagts at 69. Thus codetermination serves as a supplement
to industry-wide collective bargaining since it permits modifications of industry-wide
standards which more closely reflect the peculiar needs of a single corporation.
Partial codetermination was enacted in 1952 and exists in all other corporations with
more than 500 employees. It merely provides for one-third labor representation on the
supervisory board. The labor faction on the supervisory board does not have the
right of concurrence in the selection of the labor director on the managing board.
9 In larger corporations the supervisory board will consist of 15 or 21 directors.
With these larger boards, labor constituency is proportionately increased. McPherson,
supra note 2, at 21 n.2.
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elected by the employees.10 The fifth labor director is selected by the
other four. He may not be an employee or union member, and usually
is a labor expert or a public figure." Five more directors are elected
by the stockholders, and the eleventh director, who is to represent the
public interest, is chosen by the two factions. 2 Although the purpose
of this eleventh director is to provide a tie-breaking vote, in practice
the eleventh director seldom casts the deciding vote, and his function
is more aptly described as mediation."3 In addition to equal representa-
tion on the supervisory board, the other key provision of the full
codetermination model is that the labor director on the managing board
must be approved by the majority of the labor faction on the supervisory
board.' 4 Thus, in addition to gaining equal participation on the super-
visory board, employees have gained the ability to influence the decisions
of the labor director of the managing board-the corporate official
most closely connected with the corporation's day-to-day labor policies.
The Implications of Codetermination
It is evident from Germany's use of the full codetermination model
that the ideal of equal participation in management has not been
achieved." There has, however, been established a degree of labor
influence over corporate policy. Although the managing board con-
ducts the business of the corporation and has discretion in promoting
the corporate interest, the supervisory board can influence corporate
policy indirectly by its authority to select the managing board. Since
there is parity on the supervisory board, labor theoretically has equal
influence over corporate policy.'8
1 0 One of these directors must be a white collar salaried employee, the other a blue
collar worker. JEsrxns at 32; McPherson, supra note 2, at 21. The works council is
simila to a plant-level union and is becoming increasingly influential. JENKiNS at 38-41.
1 1 Beal, supra note 2, at 485.
12If the factions cannot agree upon the eleventh director, an elaborate procedure is
followed to reconcile the opposing views. Ultimately, if a stalemate remains, the director
is directly elected by the stockholders. McPherson, supra note 2, at 21-22. Thus, the eleventh
director might reflect stockholders interests rather than labor interests.
Iaid. at 68; Ja NEms at 36; McPherson, supra note 6, at 502-03; Comment, supra
note 2, at 216.
14 McPherson, supra note 2, at 22; Comment, supra note 2, at 216.
1 5 See Beal, supra note 2, at 497; Simitis, supra note 2, at 8.
16 JENmNs at 33.
However, the ability of labor directors to influence corporate policy from a labor per-
spective has been questioned. The labor directors are subject to the corporate conflict of
interest doctrine, which obligates them to further the corporate interest in the same man-
ner as the stockholder directors. This is said to impede their role as labor representatives.
Simitis, sura note 2, at 10-12, 14. But see Vagts at 3848, where the corporate conflict of
interest doctrine is described as being extremely flexible.
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Although the results of full codetermination in West Germany are
not conclusive, 17 it is generally conceded that it has had a beneficial im-
pact.'" Peaceful industrial relations, less manhours lost through strikes,
increased industrial morale, better working conditions, better job se-
curity, more fringe benefits, and higher wages have all been attributed
to full codetermination.'9
Full codetermination has also established enhanced communica-
tions." The stockholder directors receive continuous information on
the conditions and concerns of the employees. The labor directors gain
access to corporate information at more regular intervals and in greater
detail than is obtainable through annual financial statements.2 ' Through
increased understanding of the operations of the firm, labor is capable
of making more realistic demands during contract negotiations.
Problems which were anticipated in the operations of codetermina-
tion have not materialized. Constant confrontations between the labor
and stockholder factions on the supervisory board have not appeared.
Instead, compatibility of interest and a genuine effort to cooperate are
frequently found.2 Indeed, the success of the German experiment with
codetermination has led other Western European countries to adopt
similar worker participation models,23 and in light of these developments,
'7Vagts at 68-69; see J.NKINS at 11; Hartman, supra note 2, at 142-43.
18 JENxIs at 32-33, 44; Blumberg, supra note 2, at 560; Vagts at 78; Comment,
supra note 2, at 222. But see JENKs at 34-36.
It has been suggested, however, that the success of German industrial relations is at-
tributable to the general prosperity of the economy rather than codetermination. Code-
termination is said not to create greater harmony than a system based solely on collective
bargaining during periods of economic instability. Note, Worker Participation: An Emerg-
ing Concept in Europe, 5 N.Y.U.J. oF INT. LAw & PoLrrics 555, 559 (1972).
19 Vagts at 70-72.2
o JENKms at 32-33; Davis, Works Councils in the EEC-lI, 124 NEw L.J. 150, 151
(1974); Vagts at 76. See Comment, supra note 2, at 218. However, the usefulness of
labor directors as a vehicle of communications is questioned due to restrictions on di-
rectors in disclosure of non-public corporate information. Simitis, supra note 2, at 14.
21 Comment, supra note 2, at 219.
2 2 JFNKms at 33-34, 35; Simitis, supra note 2, at 9. See Vagts at 73. In fact, code-
termination is premised on the assumption that owner and worker interests are not in-
compatible. See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
On the other hand, partial codetermination has not received the acclaim of full codetermi-
ation. Although it provides for a useful communications system as with full codetermina-
tion, labor influence is said not to be meaningful. J NKIs at 32. The fact that any
unified stand taken by the labor faction can be overridden by the larger stockholder
faction has resulted in less incentive to cooperate on the part of the stockholder faction.
Sometimes, decisions are made in caucus before the board meeting, and they are merely
formalized at the board meeting. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 560, 565, 567. The discon-
tent with partial codetermination has led to proposed legislation to extend a modified
form of full codetermination to all other industries. JENKns at 36-38; See Comment,
sura note 2, at 222.23 See JENxms; Blumberg, supra note 2, at 560.
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the desirability and practicality of adopting a codetermination model
in the United States should be examined.
Cadetermination in the United States
The NLRA reflects two premises: the existence of an inherent
conflict between employers and employees, and an inequality of bargain-
ing power between a single employee and his employer. The Act at-
tempts to alleviate this inequality by encouraging collective bargaining
and protecting concerted activities directed at organizing workers. Em-
ployee independence in these activities has been ensured by prohibiting
employer involvement, which has resulted in limiting industrial com-
munications to collective bargaining with a recognized union.2 4 In
such a setting, codetermination as a substitute for collective bargaining
could enhance industrial communication and combat worker alienation
from the interests of the enterprise.2 5
However, implementation of codetermination in the United States
would certainly be viewed with apprehension by American labor unions,
21
since collective bargaining has evolved into the institution for solving
labor relations problems in the United States.2 7 Implementing code-
termination would diminish the role of collective bargaining, and there-
fore such proposals lack union support.28 Thus, legislative endorsement
of codetermination seems speculative. Realistically, codetermination could
only be attained by voluntary implementation by a non-union employer.'
2 4 The underlying premise of the NLRA, the existence of an inherent conflict between
employees and employers and an inequality of bargaining power between a single em-
ployee and an employer, has led to such dose scrutiny of employer activities that in-
dustrial communications is limited to collective bargaining with a recognized union. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954). However, more recently
this has become a less significant problem. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul v. NLRB, 394 F.2d
915 (6th Cir. 1968).2 5 Blumberg, supra note 2, at 570. Codetermination may reverse the trend of employee
hostility and apathy by providing the employees with an input to corporate decision-
making. With the knowledge that their interests are continuously and directly voiced at
the top of the corporate hierarchy, employees will have less reason to believe that
management is unresponsive to their needs. See, McPherson, supra note 7, at 511-12.2 6 Vagts at 77-78.
2 7 Id. Collective bargaining in West Germany is at an industry-wide level, rather than
at the individual employer level as in the United States. See note 8 supra.
28 Blumberg, sura note 2, at 570; Vagts, at 77-78.
2 9 Vagts at 77. If codetermination were established in a non-union setting, sub-
sequent union attempts to organize the employees could have difficulty in promoting union
membership since the employees would already have a device within the corporate structure
to influence corporate policy.
Voluntary implementation of codetermination by a unionized employer would create
the same problems posed by legislative endorsement. Codetermination would compete
with collective bargaining in conferring employee influence, and consequently would
probably meet with hostility from the union. The union would not be opposed to
19761
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At first glance, it may appear unrealistic to expect a non-union
employer to consider implementing codetermination. However, in a
situation where unionization seems imminent, the employer could con-
fer employee influence over corporate policy through codetermination
as an alternative to unionization. Although unionization and codetermi-
nation involve similar concessions by the employer, the adversary stance
of collective bargaining would be avoided. Employee influence would
be achieved by a framework which would promote cooperation, enhance
communications, and induce a better understanding between employers
and employees. Thus, in light of the potential advantages of employer
implementation of codetermination in a non-union setting, this note
will examine whether the restrictions of the NLRA would be violated
by such a course of action."0
CODETERMINATION AND THE NLRA
In examining whether the NLRA would pose barriers to the im-
plementation of codetermination by an employer, the initial question
is whether the codetermination framework would merit the same protec-
tion under the NLRA as other labor organizations. More specifically,
the inquiry under the NLRA would be whether a codetermination board
constitutes a labor organization under Section 2(5)31 of the Act. If this
inquiry is answered in the affirmative, the next question would be
whether employer implementation of codetermination constitutes an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (2) 2 of the Act, which pro-
hibits employer interference with the activities of a labor organization.
codetermination if it could select the labor faction on the board, but obviously no employer
would support such a proposal.
*"SQuestions concerning the feasibility of codetermination under corporate law is
beyond the scope of this note. Problems may arise concerning the permissibility of a
dual-bond structure, the feasibility of full codetermination in light of board quorum re-
quirements, or the necessity of issuing stock to employees. Yet codetermination has been
suggested as a remedy to problems in the corporate field. Blumberg, supra, note 2.
3129 U.S.C. §152(5) (1970).
3229 U.S.C. §152(a)(2) (1970). If Section 8(a)(2) is violated, Section 8(a)(1) is
also violated. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir., 1946).
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act is a blanket provision supplemented by the four succeeding
unfair labor practices, which spell out with particularity some of the most prevalent abuses.
See, Hearings on H-R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1935); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
For a discussion of the interrelationship between Section 8(a)(1) and the
other unfair labor practices, see Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(r) and
8(a)(3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORN.LL L.Q.
491 (1967); Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Em-
ployee Choice, 32 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 735, 756 (1965).
Regardless of whether a codetermination board constitutes a labor organization, em-
ployer implementation of codetermination may violate Section 8(a)(1) independently of
Section 8(a) (2). This inquiry is beyond the scope of this note.
[Vol. 51:795
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If the formation of a codetermination board by an employer constitutes
a Section 8(a) (2) violation, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) may render a disestablishment order."3
Section 2(5)
Section 2(5) provides that:
The term labor organization means any organization of any kind or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
This provision, consistent with legislative intent,34 has been interpreted
broadly. 5 The courts have not been very articulate in making section
2(5) determinations, and the decisions have not developed extra-
stautory guidelines to facilitate this determination." For the sake of
conceptual clarity, the definition of a "labor organization" can be di-
vided into three requirements:
(1) a structural requirement,
(2) a subject-matter requirement, and
(3) a functional requirement.37
If a codetermination board does not meet each of these, it would not
constitute a "labor organization."
Finally, because of the unique structure of the codetermination
board, a meaningful analysis under section 2(5) requires a two-tiered
analysis. First, one must ask whether the entire codetermination board
constitutes a labor organization, and second, whether the labor faction
of the board as a separate entity constitutes a labor organization.
1. Structural Requirement
The structural requirement is met by "an organization of any kind
. . . in which employees participate . . ." Two inquiries are presented
in determining whether codetermination would fulfill the structural re-
quirement. The first inquiry is the degree of formality and regularity
3 3Disestablishment is the usual remedy where the Board finds an organization
dominated by the employer. In contrast, where the Board finds that the employer's
conduct only constitutes support, it will merely enjoin the prohibited conduct. As to what
constitutes support or domination, see note 60, infra.
34 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
35NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
36 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971); Pacemaker Corp. v.
NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Stow Mg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1954); NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d
238 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946).
37This approach was taken in Note, suplra note 1.
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necessary for a group of employees to be considered a labor organization.
Obviously an employee group which has a charter, by-laws, and officers is
considered a labor organization. 8 Moreover, informal employee groups
with no formal structure, constitution, by-laws, officers, or dues collec-
tions have also been considered labor organizations in the light of the
policy of defining a "labor organization" broadly. 9
The second inquiry is how much employee participation is neces-
sary for an organization to meet the structural requirement."' In Local
28, Masters, Mates, and Pilots v. NLRB41 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia determined that there must be "substantial and
meaningful participation by employees." There, a 1!2 percent con-
stituency of the entire organization with full membership rights was
considered "substantial and meaningful."
Focusing on the entire codetermination board, there is no doubt
that the requisite degree of formality would be met, since a corporation's
board derives its existence from a corporate charter, promulgates
by-laws, and has officers. "Substantial and meaningful participation"
would be fulfilled since labor constituency on the board would be 2 and
labor directors would be subject to the same rights and duties as other
board members.
The labor faction as a separate entity would also fulfill these re-
quirements. Participation obviously would be "substantial and mean-
ingful," and the formality of the organization would again be derived
from the board rules. Even if the labor faction were not subject to
the same formal constraints as the rest of the board, it would still
be deemed a labor organization. Therefore, both the entire codetermina-
tion board and the labor faction of the board as a separate entity ful-
fill the structural requirement of the term "labor organization."
88Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946).
3 9 
"Such loosely-formed committees . . . constitute labor organizations within the
meaning of the Act." NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1946).
See also, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971) (no formal organiza-
tional structure, random selection of employees); Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880
(7th Cir. 1958) (no formal organization, no officers, no dues, no by-laws, rotation of em-
ployee participation on the committee); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d
Cir. 1954) (lack of formal structure, monthly meetings of the president of the firm with
all the employees, question and answer period); Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB,
202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953) (no formal organization, by-laws, dues, or treasury).
40 In deciding whether employee committees are labor organizations under Sections
2(5) and 8(a) (2) the courts have not made a distinction where there are also management
representatives on the committee. See, e.g., NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465
(1st Cir. 1955).
41 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 16, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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2. Subject Matter Requirement
The subject matter requirement of the definition of a "labor
organization" is met if the organization deals with the employer "con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or conditions of work." The Supreme Court in NLRA v.
Cabot Carbon Co.' indicated that an organization dealing with the em-
ployer on any one of these subjects would bring the organization within
the statutory definition of a labor organization.
In the conventional single board structure, the extent of board in-
volvement in the decisionmaking process is in part dependent upon the
size of the corporation. In a small firm, especially one which is family
owned, the board of directors tends to be concerned with the daily
operations of the corporation, and would undoubtedly discuss matters
contained in section 2(5). In a large corporation, the board tends to
give a broad framework of policies to management, and is less likely
to become involved in the decisionmaking process itself. Nevertheless,
the board might give directives concerning labor disputes and other
matters contained in section 2(5).
Whether codetermination would lead to the increasing involvement
of the codetermination board in the daily operations of the corporation,
and in particular in the matters contained in section 2(5), is a factual
question which will have to be determined when such a case arises.
With a dual board structure it is conceivable that the supervisory board
will be so far removed from the daily operations of the corporation that
labor matters will not be discussed. In West Germany, however, co-
determination has had the contrary effect, and labor matters are dealt
with on the supervisory board. 3 Therefore, it may be concluded that
matters contained in section 2(5) would probably be discussed on a
codetermination board, and thus both the entire codetermination board
and the labor faction as a separate entity would fulfill the subject
matter requirement of the definition of a "labor organization."
3. Functional Requirement
An organization "which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part of dealing with employers" fulfills the functional requirement of
the definition of a "labor organization." In evaluating whether the en-
tire codetermination board would meet the functional requirement of a
labor organization, a conceptual difficulty arises in that a board of
42360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959).
4 See Vagts at 77-78.
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directors is generally considered the ultimate agent of the employer.44
If the board is to be an employer and a labor labor organization simul-
taneously, the inquiry into the functional requirement would be in terms
of whether the board is dealing with itself.4" Furthermore, an analysis
under the section of the NLRA which defines employer, section 2(2) 41
leads to the conclusion that if the entire codetermination board is deemed
a labor organization, the board can no longer be considered an em-
ployer. Applying section 2(2) to codetermination in this manner creates
the anomaly of having an organization which employs people, and yet
is devoid of an employer for the purposes of the NLRA
These problems can be circumvented by examining whether -the
labor faction as a separate entity fulfills the functional requirement.
Thus, the stockholder faction can be considered the employer, and sec-
tion 2(2) no longer poses a conceptual barrier. The inquiry concerning
the functional requirement would then be whether the labor faction is
"dealing with" the stockholder faction.
In NLRB v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co.,4" the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit was confronted with delineating the scope of the term
"dealing with." The employer had established a Junior Board, consisting
of workers, which made recommendations to the employer concerning
matters contained in the subject matter requirement. The employer
argued that the Junior Board did not demand, or negotiate, but merely
44 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-2-11(a) (Burns 1971): "The business of every corpora-
tion shall be managed by a board of directors."; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1975):
"The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."
45One may define the employer by focusing on the stockholders or on management.
However, stockholder power to affect corporation policy is extremely limited, and there-
fore cannot realistically be viewed as the employer. A focus on management as the em-
ployer encounters even worse conceptual problems, since managment would be the em-
ployer dealing with the board of directors as the labor organization.
4629 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970):
The term employer includes any person acting as an agent of an employer;
directly or indirectly, but shall not include .. . any labor organization (other than
when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent
of such labor organization.
4 7 The exception when a labor organization acts in the capacity of an employer could
arguably be used to fill the void. This provision is designed to permit union staffs to
organize and bargain collectively with the union as their employer. See, e.g., Office Em-
ployees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). However, in the union staff situation,
the employment relationship between the staff and the union is distinct from the employ-
ment relationship between the employees which the union represents and the company.
In this instance, there is only one employment relationship, and therefore the exception
would not seem to be applicable. Furthermore, it creates conceptual problems in that
the employer and the labor organization are the same body. The inquiry into the func-
tional requirement would be whether the codetermination board deals with itself.
48156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946).
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made recommendations, and therefore it was not "dealing with" the em-
ployer. The court responded:
Respondents say that this Junior Board did not deal, it only recom-
mended and that final decision was with management. Final decision
is always with management, although when a claim is made by a
well-organized, good-sized union, management is doubtless more
strongly influenced in its decision than it would be by a recommenda-
tion of a board which it, itself, has selected and which has been
provided with no fighting arms. 9
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,5" the Supreme Court was faced
with the same argument. The employer had established a committee con-
sisting of employees, which would discuss and make recommendations
concerning working conditions and grievances. Again, the employer
urged that discussions and recommendations did not fall within the
parameters of "dealing with," because the final decision remained with
the employer. The Supreme Court responded:
But this is true of all such "dealing," whether with an independent
or company-dominated "labor organization." The principle distinc-
tion lies in the unfettered power of the former to insist upon its
requests.6 '
The basic premise in each decision is that there is no functional
difference between a recognized union bargaining for a contract and an
employee committee making requests and recommendations. In both
instances, the final decision rests with the employer and the power of
the employee representative is limited to requesting, although there
may be significant differences in the persuasiveness and enforceability
of the requests.
Common usage of the term "dealing with" could lead one to con-
clude that under full codetermination the labor faction is dealing with
the stockholder faction since they are equally represented. However,
in delineating the scope of "dealing with," the courts premised the
analysis on the fact that the final decision would always rest with
the employer. On this basis the interaction between the labor faction
and the stockholder faction can be distinguished. The labor faction
does not recommend certain action and then await the decision of
the stockholder faction; rather, it makes the decision together with
the stockholder faction. With equal representation on the board, there
will be no majority vote and therefore no decision, unless representa-
49 Id. at 708.
50360 U.S. 203 (1959).
51 Id. at 214.
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tives of either faction are swayed to accept the other's point of view.
Unless a decision is reached the status quo remains, and the stockholder
faction cannot unilaterally implement its point of view. In the case of
an additional board member elected by both factions, the situation in a
deadlock would resemble arbitration. Neither faction can break the
deadlock, and the decision is finally made by a person who has been
mutually entrusted with the power to make an equitable decision.5"
Applying this distinction, it is arguable that the labor faction on a
full codetermination board does not fulfill the functional requirement. 3
The NLRA intended to bring within the parameters of the definition
of a "labor organization" all organizations which have the purpose of
promoting employee interests, so as to subject such organizations to the
protection of section 8(a) (2). The protection against employer inter-
ference was deemed necessary due to the inherently coercive nature
of the employment relationship.54 In this light, it can be argued that
a codeterminaiton board has no need for special protection, since the
employer no longer has unfettered discretion with respect to corporate
policy, and more particularly subject matters contained in section 2(5).
Policies cannot be developed unless the labor faction acquiesces in the
proposals. Therefore, the inherently coercive nature of the employment
relationship no longer exists, and a full codetermination board could
be deemed not to be a labor organization.
This argument has merit where codetermination has been estab-
lished irrevocably such as by governmental complusion. However,
where codetermination is voluntarily established by the employer, his
discretion may be fettered in the particular decision at issue, but his
discretion is essentially still unfettered due to the power to dissolve the
codetermination board if the labor faction's views are repugnant to the
stockholder interests. Thus, the inherently coercive nature of the em-
52 Under partial codetermination with minority employee representation on the board,
the stockholder faction could always obtain a majority vote on issues. If a simple ma-
jority vote is required for a binding decision, the situation would resemble the conventional
employer-employee relationship: the labor faction uses its power of persuasion to recom-
mend action but the final decision will be made by the stockholder faction. Such a rela-
tionship would fall squarely within the Cabot Carbon concept of "dealing with."
However, corporate by-laws regarding voting requirements may provide for a 2/3
or 3/4 majority on matters which fall within the subject-matter requirement under Sec-
tion 2(5). Where the stockholder faction cannot achieve a decision without swaying at
least one labor board member, it cannot be said that the ultimate decision rests with the
stockholder faction.
53 This argument is also applicable to the partial codetermination with modified voting
requirements alternative posed in note 51, supra.
54 "Activities, innocuous and without significance, as between two individuals eco-
nomically independent of each other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous
significance and heighten to proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in
his relationship with his employees." 3 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 125 (1939).
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ployment relationship still exists due to the possible threat of dis-
possessing the employees of the privilege of board membership. There-
fore, it would be difficult to argue persuasively that the interaction under
full codetermination does not fall within the scope of "dealing with".55
In conclusion, the labor faction of the codetermination board ful-
fills the structural and subject matter requirements and probably also
fulfills the functional requirement of the definition of "labor organiza-
tion." In the event that the labor faction is found to be a labor organiza-
tion, there must be a further inquiry to determine whether there has
been a violation of section 8 (a) (2).
Section 8(a) (2)
Section 8(a) (2) " provides that it is an unfair labor practice for'
an employer:
To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.
The specific evil which this section is designed to eliminate is
the "company union," a device used by the employer to thwart genuine
collective bargaining by dominating the union.57
Under this section the courts have strictly scrutinized employer
involvement in activities of labor organizations on the basis of a
subjective test from the perspective of the employee:
[T]he question is whether the organization exists as the result of a
choice freely made by the employees, in their own interests, and
without regard to the desires of their employer, or whether the em-
ployees formed and supported the organization, rather than some
other, because they knew their employer desired it and feared the con-
sequences if they did not. 8
55Moreover, the concurrent development of Section 2(5) and Section 8(a)(2) would
diminish the persuasiveness of this argument. Although the courts more recently have
permitted employers to become involved in employee activities where the motivation is
friendly cooperation, the change in policy has been reflected in the analysis under Section
8(a)(2), and not in limiting the definition of "labor organization" under Section 2(5). All
organizations which promote employee interests are still considered labor organizations,
but are subject to less rigorous protection under Section 8(a)(2).
56 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
57S. Rxr. No. 573, 74th Cong., lst Sess. 9-11 (1935); H.R. RFP. No. 1147, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17-19 (1935).
5s8NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1954). The subjective test was first
explicitly acknowledged in NLRB v. Thompson Prods., Inc., 130 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1942).
The court derived this test from NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940), NLRB v. Link-
Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941), and International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S.
72 (1940), and quoted International Assn of Machinists: "[Wjhere the employees would
have just cause to believe that the solicitors professedly for a labor organization were
acting for and on behalf of the management, the Board would be justified in concluding
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Pursuant to this test, which was designed to insure the develop-
ment of truly independent unions, any employer support, no matter how
meager 9 and regardless of the employer's good faith,6" was prohibited."1
This test is based upon a belief in an irreconcilable conflict of interests
between the employer and employee,62 which leads to the conclusion
that the only reason an employer would interfere with his employees'
representative organization would be to further his own interests and
thus defeat the best interests of his employees. 63
However, this assumption of irreconcilable conflict is of question-
able validity in the contemporary employment relationship. The work-
ing class-managerial class distinction has faded, and American work-
ers perceive themselves as middle-class citizens with specialized occup-
tional ideologies." Consequently, the idea that the NLRA must have
contemplated a permissible range of industrial cooperation has emerged."
This change in attitude has resulted in a judicial approach which
encourages cooperation between management and labor. The forerunner
of this group of decisions, Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v.
NLRB, 6 indicated that cooperation was the primary purpose of the
that they did not have the complete and unhampered freedom of choice which the Act
contemplates." 311 U.S. at 80.
59 See, e.g., Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1946).
6 0 See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251
(1939).
61Cf. 3 NLRB Ann. Rep. 125-26 (1939). The Board makes a distinction between
dominating and supporting in formulating the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Carpenter
Steel Co., 76 NLRB 670, 673 (1948). This distinction has been justified on the basis that
"the free choice by employees of an agent capable of acting as their true representative, in the
case of a dominated union, is improbable under any circumstances, while the free choice
of an assisted but undominated union, capable of acting as their true representative, is a
reasonable possibility after the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices have been
dissipated," NLRB v. UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958). Eventually the lengths to which
the NLRB would go to find interference invoked criticism by the Courts of Appeals. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Brown Co., 160 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Brown-Brockmeyer
Corp., 143 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Clinton Woolen Mfg. Co., 141 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v.
NLRB, 126 F.2d 3-14 (7th Cir. 1942).
62 Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YAIZ
L.J. 510, 515 (1973).
63See Note, New Standard for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82
YALE L.J. 510 (1973).
04 Ross, Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement in Advanced Industrial Society,
50 VA. L. REy. 1359, 1379 (1964).
65 NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J.,dissent-
ing). Feldman & Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 35 TuL. L. Rav. 365 (1961). In addition, the philosophy behind the
1947 amendments to the NLRA was said to decrease the emphasis on encouraging col-
lective bargaining. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
Hlxv. L. REv. 274 (1948); Petro, Labor Relations Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 733, 765 (1960);
See also, Note, Section 8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plan Unions and Committees, 9
STAN. L. REV. 351 (1957).
66 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
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NLRA. However, the decisions subsequent to Chicago Rawhide reflect
a state of confusion in which it is difficult to discern a judicially-
accepted conceptual framework.'87 There are two factors which con-
tribute to this confusion. First, the courts have been unable to reconcile
the overlap between the strict "hands off" approach and the new co-
operation approach, resulting in uncertainty as to which policy is to be
emhasized.68 Second, every case is determined upon its own facts, and
elements which are deemed to show illegal domination in one instance
may, in another setting, be considered entirely proper."9
Out of this quagmire there have emerged three considerations which
are important to the current section 8(a) (2) interpretation. First, did
the employer's activities constitute actual or merely potential interfer-
ence? In determining whether the employee committee was dominated
and supported by the employer, the court in Chicago Rawhide stated:
Words and actions which might dominate the employees in their choice
of a bargaining agent do not constitute domination proscribed by the
Act unless the employees are actually dominated. The employer-
employee relationship itself offers many possibilities for domination
which is one of the reasons for the original enactment of the [NLRA],
but actual domination must be shown before a violation is estab-
lished.70
The Board found the following to be indicia of domination and support:
the immediate acceptance of the committee by the employer without
inquiry as to its representation status; the unrestricted, although un-
exercised, power to lay off or transfer the committee members; per-
mitting elections on company time and premises; employer super-
vision of election notices on company bulletin boards; permitting the
committee to transact business on company premises; and allowing the
second step of the grievance process on company time without deduc-
tion of pay. The court reasoned that:
These acts do no more than evidence the presence of potential means
for interference and support, a possibility that is always present to
some degree in an employer-employee relationship. But, without evi-
dence of the realization of that potential, they do not furnish a sub-
stantial factual basis for an unfair labor practice finding.71
67 Compare the Section 8(a)(2) analyses in Note, supra note 61, uith Note, supra
note 1.68 Cf. 47 VA. L. RE.v. 1092, 1097 (1961).
69 Compare, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson-Ramo Woolridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir.
1962) with NLRB v. Post PubL Co., 311 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962) and Chicago Rawhide
Mg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
70221 F.2d 165, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1955) (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at 170.
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Second, did the employer's involvement affect the employees'
freedom of choice? This is essentially the remnant of the subjective
test. In Chicago Rawhide, the court indicated that the subjective test
was still to be applied. 72 However, the court never explained how the
subjective test, which is the tool for enforcing the rigid "hands off"
approach, fits into the new approach of encouraging cooperation. Yet
it was clear that indicia of domination under the old subjective test
would no longer be indicia of domination under an approach designed
to foster cooperation. Eventually, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in NLRB v. Keller Ladder Southern, Inc.,7" discussed the ex-
tent of the continuing viability of the subjective test. The court indi-
cated that the right to be protected is the guarantee of complete and
unhampered freedom of choice by the employees in their selection of a
bargaining representative.
This right, on the other hand, as valuable as it is, must be con-
sidered in context of the policy of the Act which fosters cooperation
between employers, employees and labor organizations. This-policy
necessarily envisions a balance to the extent that the rights of all
are recognized and safeguarded to the maximum degree possible. So
long as the acts of cooperation do not interfere with the freedom of
choice of the employees, there is no violation of the Act.74
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further explained the sub-
jective test in Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB :
We indicated that the employer must be shown to have interfered
with the 'freedom of choice' of the employees .... The sum of this
is that a Section 8(a) (2) finding must rest on a showing that the em-
ployees' free choice, either in type of organization or in assertion of
demands, is stifled by the degree of employer involvement at issue
76
Third, did the employer's involvement stem from an intent to
coerce or improperly influence the employees' free choice? In Chicago
Rawhide, the Board found that permitting the employee committees
to meet on company property during working hours constituted a
section 8 (a) (2) violation. The court responded by stating:
The fact that the Company did not know that a few employees were
attending meetings on company time, but did put a stop to the prac-
tice as soon as it was discovered, shows that the Company was not
72 Id. at 168.
78405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
74Id. at 667.
75503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
76 Id. at 630.
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intending, by permitting this practice, to coerce or influence the em-
ployees' choice of bargaining representative. 77
In summary, the use of these three criteria signal a shift in labor
policy by the courts. Under the old policy, which stressed the impor-
tance of independent employee organizational activity, the courts closely
scrutinized any employer involvement in the organizational activity.
Focusing on the impact that the employer involvement had -on the
employees was an effective means to this end. With the current em-
phasis on encouragaing industrial cooperation, this narrow outlook is
inadequate, and a broader view in which all the interests are considered
is necessary. By broadening the inquiry into the three factors dis-
cussed above, employee interests are not the only considerations which
dictate unlawful interference. An approach wherein employer inter-
ests are also considered is better suited to effectuate the new policy and
results in a range of permissible employer involvement. 78
CODETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 8(a) (2)
Determining whether the implementation of codetermination would
violate section 8(a) (2) is difficult due to the lack of predictability in
the current interpretation of section 8 (a) (2). In addition, the ques-
tion of codetermination in the United States is still embryonic,7 9 and
the section 8(a) (2) outcome is highly dependent on the total factual
situation. Therefore the most probable scenario for the implementation
of codetermination will be examined.
The strongest case for not finding an 8(a) (2) violation is one in
which the employees initiate the idea of codetermination, and demand
from the employer that employee representatives be allowed to attend
and vote at board meetings. If the proposal is accepted by the employer
and the employees maintain their independence in electing the repre-
sentatives, and the representatives maintain their independence in their
board dealings, there should be no section 8(a) (2) violation. Under
similar circumstances, employee committees have been held not to con-
travene section 8(a) (2).1 The formation and administration in this
example are achieved by the employees' unfettered free choice and
77221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955). Subsequent cases have analyzed intent in terms
of anti-union bias. See Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971); Modern
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Post Publ. Co., 311 F.2d
S65 (7th Cir. 1962).
78Cf. NLRE v. Keller Ladder Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
9 Blumberg, supra note 2, at 563.8 0 Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Prince
Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (Ist Cir. 1964). Cf. NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314
F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963); Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961).
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without any improper intent by the employer. There is implicit con-
trol in that the employer may veto the election of undesireable em-
ployees by their transfer or discharge, but unless the employer actually
does so, this constitutes control which is inherent in the employment
relationship and should be considered potential rather than actual
control.
However, this is a highly unrealistic set of facts, since it is un-
likely that employees would demand board representation rather than
a union unless they knew beforehand that the employer would acquiesce
in or actively support the proposal. A more probable set of facts is one
in which the employer proposes to implement codetermination and the
employees acquiesce in the proposal. The employer would execute the
plan but would not attempt to coerce the employees' choice of repre-
sentatives. In this situation it is clear that the formation of the organiza-
tion would have been dominated by the employer, since the employer
initiated the plan and implemented it." The usual remedy for em-
ployer domination of the formation of a labor organization is the dis-
establishment of the organization. 2  However, if subsequent to the
employer-dominated formation the labor organization functions inde-
pendently, disestablishment may be considered improper." In de-
termining whether the employer in this instance is dominating the ad-
ministration of the labor organization, the employer's motive and the
employees' satisfaction with the labor organization become decisive
factors." If the employer has a history of anti-union bias and code-
81 See International Union of United Brewery Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297, 299
(D.C. Cir. 1961). The employer initiated the idea of an independent union, indicating
that he would pay for attorney's fees for the formation of the union. He eventually had
his attorney write a collective bargaining agreement, and submitted it to the employees
to sign. This was considered domination of the formation of the labor organization. ee
also NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1962).
82See, e.g., Buitoni Foods Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 767 (1960), enforced, 298 F.2d 169
(3d Cir. 1962). Even if the six month statute of limitations of Section 10(b) has ex-
pired on the charge of a dominated formation, employer domination of the formation
sheds light on the lack of independent administration of the labor organization and
may still lead to a disestablishment order. Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970),
modified, 454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1972); Ampex Corp., 168 N.L.R.B. 742 (1967), modified,
442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971).
If the NLRB finds that the employer's involvement only amounts to support or
interference, a cease and desist order is given rather than a disestablishment order. See
authorities cited in note 60 supra.8 5 lnternational Union of United Brewry Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.
1961). However, if the formation and administration are both dominated, so that the labor
organization does not function independently at the time of the NLRB inquiry, a dis-
establishment order is undoubtedly justified. See, e.g., Schwarzenbach-Huber Co., 170
N.L.R.B. 1532 (1968), modified, 408 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1969); Ampex Corp., 168 N.L.R.B.
742 (1967).84 See Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 333 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1964). But see NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread
Die Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970).
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termination is implemented at a time of organizational activity by a
union, the court might reasonably infer an improper motive in the
establishment of codetermination.85  On the other hand, if the em-
ployer has no record of anti-union bias, the courts should be less willing
to find a violation.6 If the employees' preference for representative
organization was not affected," and they are satisfied with a codetermi-
nation board, 8 this should also make the court less willing to find a
violation.
CONCLUSION
The West German model of codetermination results in increased
labor influence in the corporate structure, but not to the extent of
equal participation in management. It provides for enhanced com-
munications and an element of employee control over the corporate
policymakers, and as such may help solve some of the industrial woes
in the United States. Since legislative implementation is unlikely at
this time, codetermination would have to be achieved through volun-
tary implementation, which creates the problem of compliance with the
labor laws.
In analyzing codetermination under the NLRA, it may be con-
cluded that the labor faction on the codetermination board would con-
stitute a labor organization. It remains unclear whether employer im-
plementation of codetermination would violate section 8(a) (2) due to
the current unsettled interpretation of that section. The trend is to per-
mit cooperation between employers and employees, and implementation
of codetermination for their mutual benefits should be permissible.
ERIK B. WULFF -
85 e, e.g., International Union of United Brewery Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297,
299 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1971).8 Cf. NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968); Modern Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Post PubL Co., 311 F.2d
565, 569 (-7th Cir. 1962).
87Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
88 Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
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